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Abstract
We motivate using non-digital games to teach computer
security concepts and describe the inspirations driving
the design of our board game, [d0x3d!]. We describe
our experiences in designing game mechanics that teach
security principles and our observations in developing an
open-source game product. We survey our experiences
with playing the game with students and our plans for
supporting the game in and out of the classroom.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we describe our experiences in develop-
ing [d0x3d!], a cooperative tabletop game that encodes
modest pedagogical objectives intended to expose young
people to topics in computer security. We describe our
game’s goals, the process of integrating mechanics and
art design to support informal lessons, and our experi-
ences in releasing [d0x3d!] as an open-source product.
We believe [d0x3d!] has the potential to start a dialogue
with young audiences about the value of data and to ex-
pose students to opportunities as computer security pro-
fessionals. We have informally play tested [d0x3d!] with
over a hundred students, across both secondary and post-
secondary education, and report on those experiences.
1.1 Motivation
As a discipline, computer security goes largely ignored
in the K-12 curriculum. Looking at computer science
more generally, there only 14 states that include CS in-
struction as part of their education standards [26]. When
computer science is taught, it is often as an elective
course, in preparation for the advanced placement (AP)
exam. The College Board, which develops and admin-
isters AP exams, reports that in 2011 a total of 3.4 mil-
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lion AP exams were given, of which only 20,000 were
in CS [8]. This is particularly remarkable when com-
pared to other STEM disciplines: over 150,000 AP Biol-
ogy and 300,000 AP Calculus exams were administered
in the same year. Indeed, Computer Science is the only
AP exam that has seen a decline over the last ten years.
Perhaps even more troubling, access to a computer sci-
ence curriculum is unequal, unrepresentative of the na-
tion’s demographics and tightly correlated with future
careers in CS. Using the demographics of AP CS exam
takers as an indicator, only 21% are women and 8% are
a recognized minority. This is compared to 49% female
and 58% minority across all AP exams [8]. The Col-
lege Board reports that students enrolled in AP CS are
eight times more likely to major in CS [21], while a 2010
Google employee survey showed that nearly all CS ma-
jors (98%) reported having exposure to CS prior to col-
lege, compared to less than half of non-CS majors (45%).
The US is failing to meet current demand for IT se-
curity professionals [24]. The 2011 Taulbee survey re-
ports the production of BS degrees in computer science
and computer engineering has decreased over the past
decade, although the 2012 Taulbee survey shows recent
improvement in these trends. Looking into the near fu-
ture, the production of computing majors is falling be-
hind projected job openings by a factor of five and a
half [1]. If these trends continue, it will have a lasting,
negative impact on the nation’s economic future [7].
Cybersecurity education programs are finding it diffi-
cult to meet new and projected workforce demands [5].
While specialized programs and professional certificates
may be an appropriate short-term strategies to satisfy the
immediate need for qualified professionals [12], future
demand needs to be addressed by curbing more systemic
trends affecting CS education. Indeed, these feelings are
reflected in the US CyberSpace Policy Review, a 2009
report commissioned by President Obama, which recom-
mends the establishment of new K–12 educational pro-
grams for digital safety, ethics, and security, as well as
the expansion of university curricula in these topics.
Cybersecurity education is accompanied by its own
unique challenges, which act as a barrier to adoption.
While security issues permeate nearly all aspects of our
day-to-day lives, the technical complexities and mun-
dane subtleties of computer security do not easily lend
themselves to a high school or underclass college cur-
ricula [4, 17]. Thus, a significant challenge in computer
security pedagogy is in developing tools that teach secu-
rity concepts to a wide audience (particularly non-STEM
students) and that foster curiosity in security topics and
that develop interest in CS and STEM disciplines.
Of course, we are not the first to recognize or attempt
to rectify these curricular deficiencies. Efforts to inject
CS topics into K-12 education generally follow one of
two approaches: efforts to bring CS into the curriculum
by modifying state and national standards, and efforts
to form extra-curricular clubs and activities. Games are
appropriate for use in both of these settings, and have
strong potential for being used to teach cybersecurity
topics to students at both secondary and post-secondary
levels. We posit that finding new ways of bringing se-
curity topics into classrooms and clubs will have a pos-
itive effect on STEM education as a whole. We must
cultivate a constellation of educational instruments able
to stimulate interest in CS, with a high potential for en-
gaging students without an inherent inclination for CS.
We believe informal games can be an important part of
the solution if we (as a community) understand both how
to merge informal play with pedagogical objectives, and
how to evaluate the effectiveness of games in the con-
text of enhancing student understanding of cybersecurity
and preventing misunderstandings. We share our experi-
ences, as a step toward these goals.
2 Related Work
Digital games have been used in the context of teaching
security concepts and developing security awareness, in-
cluding CMU’s Anti-Phishing Phil [23], the Naval Post-
graduate School’s CyberCiege [18], and the US Military
Academy’s MAADNET [15]. Whereas, the games Pro-
tection Poker [25] and Elevation of Privilege are non-
digital games that “gamify” the practice of risk assess-
ment for software development.
Full-simulation cybersecurity exercises engage play-
ers in a game that very closely simulates real-world at-
tack and defense mechanics. Examples of these games
include DEF CON’s capture the flag contest, UCSB’s
International capture the flag (iCTF) competition, and
NSA’s Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX).
Similarly, some security coursework has used narra-
tive and play in ways that more tightly align in-game
strategy with its security lessons. For example, the Univ.
of New Mexico uses a digital variant of the parlor game
Werewolf to explore information flow policy in class [11].
More directly related to ours is the game Control-Alt-
Hack, a re-skinning of Steve Jackson’s Ninja Burger in
the context of a security consulting firm [10]. The game
has modest pedagogical goals, and is designed to expose
the player to a variety of computer security terminology,
careers and applications.
3 Design Goals
Several principles and goals guided [d0x3d!]’s design.
Fun. The intention was to design a social, challeng-
ing, dynamic, re-playable, rewarding, and un-confusing
game—a game that one might play outside the class-
room. We believe fun games can be an effective out-
reach tool, with the potential to expose players to new
ideas and careers, and to stimulate continued study in the
field. Games that are not fun do not engage students and,
necessarily, will be ineffective at outreach.
Accessible. Tabletop games have the potential to engage
students with low computer literacy and low “computer
confidence.” Our goal was to build a game that is sim-
ple to learn and play, requiring no technical background
or familiarity with a computer. Further, tabletop games
have no pretense of presenting a technical reality, sim-
plifying and omitting technical details. This can be em-
braced, to make broad security themes (rather than tech-
nical details) accessible to wide populations.
Collaborative. Social play is important for demonstrat-
ing security as an interactive field, despite popular mis-
conceptions of computer science as a solitary or isolating
pursuit. Cooperative games are more faithful to player
expectations for social interaction, compared to the head-
sets and interfaces of multi-user digital games. Collabo-
rative games may be appropriate for classroom settings,
where arguing and contentious interactions are avoided.
In our game, we sought collaborative mechanics, allow-
ing students to collectively strategize and problem solve.
Meaningful. Board games are finite, discrete, non-
deterministic systems where humans act as the primary
computational device. Beza´kova´ et al. [3] observe that
tabletop games provide a context in which students can
reason about simple algorithms. Berland and Lee [2] ob-
serve that cooperative, strategic games allow students to
engage in distributed, computational reasoning. Horn et
al. [16] use board games to perform discrete simulations
foundational to agent-based modeling. We believe games
can leverage these observations, to support procedural
and analytical reasoning about adversaries.
Unobtrusive. The direct and indirect costs of main-
taining a computer lab are high; additionally, classroom
computers are constrained in what software runs (even
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willing teachers may not be able to install software of
their choice). In contrast, our game should be quick to
set up, easy to store, and require no special equipment to
play. Further, it should be freely distributed online, so it
can be printed and played at small cost.
Modifiable. One goal was to release the game under a li-
cense supporting modification. Making the game open to
adaptation and re-mixing invites player-developed add-
ons and variants. By developing new game pieces, me-
chanics, and rules, players engage critically and person-
ally with the medium, exercising a level of experimenta-
tion beyond that of typical digital games.
Catalytic. The game should create the context for a
broad security conversation, rather than reflect or em-
body some deeply-embedded, single lesson. This allows
the game to be technically inaccurate, while still creat-
ing opportunities to contextualize and abstract complex
security concepts in follow-on discussion.
4 Game Mechanics
[d0x3d!] is a cooperative board game in which players
assume the role of white-hat hackers, tasked to retrieve
a set of valuable digital assets held by an adversarial
network. There are four digital assets in the game—
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Authentication
Credentials, Financial Data and Intellectual Property
(IP)—reflecting the idea that a variety of data is valued,
and valued in different ways. The object of [d0x3d!] is
to infiltrate and navigate the network, recover the four
stolen assets, and successfully escape without detection.
The adversary of the game (the network administrators)
is encoded in its mechanics, as the network periodically
adjusts its state, by either patching or decommissioning
servers for forensic investigation. If time runs out, the ad-
versary posts the players’ assets to the Internet (the title
‘d0x3d’ is hacker slang for the practice of intentionally
releasing PII on the web for the purpose of embarrass-
ment). Players, thus, struggle against the game itself,
either winning together or losing together. The game’s
mechanics are largely inspired by Matt Leacock’s For-
bidden Island 1.
The intention of [d0x3d!] is to create an artificial con-
text for discussing real ideas in network security. As part
of the design process, we made a conscious effort to in-
troduce and use appropriate security terminology—e.g.,
administrators, intrusion detection, compromise, patch,
zero-day and forensics—in ways consistent with their
real world interpretations. The game encourages students
to role-play, by adopting hacker personas and viewing a
network from the perspective of an attacker.
1For a more detailed explanation of game play, please see the
game’s website, d0x3d.com.
Before commenting how we relate the game’s design
to its security narrative or learning objectives, we briefly
summarize the game’s mechanics. Players must collect
all four digital assets and then escape the network by
using their abilities and exploiting network vulnerabili-
ties. On a player’s round, she spends from a per-turn al-
lowance to take some number of actions: compromising
a node, moving to another compromised node, and trad-
ing cards with other players. She then receives some dig-
ital loot cards, representing discovered knowledge about
system vulnerabilities or data associated with the target
assets. A player recovers a digital asset by discarding
four cards picturing that asset, while occupying its corre-
sponding capture point. At the end of the player’s turn,
the network adjusts itself: players follow rules to change
the network’s state based on pulling cards from a special
patch deck. This represents the actions of a non-player
character, the network admin, who impedes the progress
of the players toward their goal.
4.1 Collaborative Games
Research has consistently found gender and social dif-
ferences in player gratification and play preferences. In
particular, many studies suggest women are less likely
than men to choose to engage in competitive games or
competitive situations [19, 20, 13, 9]. As it was our in-
tention to develop a game appealing to and appropriate
for mixed-gender audiences, we felt it was inappropri-
ate to force players into competitive situations Instead,
we sought to develop a cooperative game, where players
collaborate socially to achieve a common goal.
In our game, each player has access to a special abil-
ity unique to their role. Zagal et al. [27] studied collab-
orative board games, finding unique roles increased in-
teraction or bargaining during group coordination, even
facilitating players to act selflessly in their actions for
the group. Further, we believe collaborative games fit
into a classroom well, as they mirror the type of goal-
based social cooperation necessary in projects and group
work. As in other collaborative board games, the source
of game tension is not other players but, instead, a semi-
random, in-game event affecting all players.
4.2 In-Game Security Terminology
Our pedagogical goals to communicate security termi-
nology are modest: to use select, network security terms
as appropriately as possible and to pique curiosity in the
subject matter, without causing confusion or misunder-
standings. We let our professional judgements guide our
mapping of terms to game pieces and mechanics, rather
than structure a game around the learning objectives of
any particular curricula.
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At a high level, generally, each game piece commu-
nicates some network or security terminology or idea.
Admittedly, some mechanics are introduced purely for
balance and the use of a security-themed narrative is op-
portunistic. For example, the mechanic in which four
cards are combined (as part of collecting trophies needed
to complete the game) are described in terms of key
shares, combined according to a secret-sharing scheme
to decrypt and collect the digital asset stored at a cap-
ture point. In the following sections, we describe some
more essential design choices that support our security
narrative and literacy goals.
4.3 Network Representation
The modularity of the [d0x3d!] board allows players to
rearrange the layout and configuration of the “network”
at the start of each game. While we suggest an ini-
tial topology for the network, players can explore new
and interesting network topologies, adding to replaya-
bility. Each network node tile represents some com-
mon enterprise infrastructure, e.g. DNS servers, mail
servers and single-sign-on servers. Some components,
such as the Firewall and VPN Gateway, are “hardened,”
which require additional actions to compromise and, like
their real-world counterparts, simulate an impediment to
hacker movement through the network.
The iconography selected for each node both rein-
forces their meaning and adds additional learning oppor-
tunities. For example, we attempt to communicate the
diversity of network clients using nodes that represent a
laptop, desktop, tablet and mobile phone, showing their
similarity in role by labeling each as a Client node.
We attempt to implement the capture point mechanic
in a way that reinforces the roles of the infrastructure and
the interpretation of the digital asset held there. For ex-
ample, the capture points for the Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) asset are an IMAP and SMTP server.
The association helps to reinforce that email can hold
PII, and may help students reflect on their experiences of
sharing personal information in email.
4.4 Threat Representation
In [d0x3d!], the players and their actions are the basic
source of threats against the game’s network. The hacker
roles reflect the diversity of threats faced by the network:
malware, social engineering, insider threats, cryptanaly-
sis, botnets, etc. Some player roles were ascribed me-
chanics to be illustrative of hacker threats; for example,
the Botmaster’s ability to leverage his botnet’s through-
put to communicate more data per turn. Other roles
are merely evocative of an ability: the Cryptanalyst can
move diagonally due to her ability to see problems “from
a different angle.”
Players occasionally draw zero-day exploit cards,
which they can use later, to immediately compromise and
occupy any network node, even hardened servers. The
zero-days are each named after the software vulnerabil-
ity being exploited at the target, such as a Buffer Over-
flow or an Integer Overflow. The ability to use these ex-
ploits at will against arbitrary targets may be unrealistic,
but does serve to reinforce the idea that flaws are ubiqui-
tous, that attacks can be relatively simple to deploy (i.e.
canned exploits), and that making a service immune to
compromise may be difficult or impossible in a large, di-
verse network. Additionally, the single-use nature of the
cards reflect the knowledge disclosure and need for strat-
egy typically associated with zero-days.
4.5 Defense Representation
The network under attack is represented by the board’s
dynamic state: nodes may be available, available but
compromised, or decommissioned due to compromise.
The per-round patch mechanic illustrates the challenges
inherent to a “penetrate-and-patch” approach to security.
Through these mechanics, players may recognize that
patching allies temporary defects, does not prevent fu-
ture attack and may, in fact, introduce new vulnerabili-
ties. The reactionary nature of the penetrate-then-patch
cycle is further captured through the decommissioning
mechanic. If a hacker’s footprint is noticed (if a player
occupies the tile actively being patched), the player is
ejected from the server and the node is removed from the
game “for forensic investigation.”
As in other cooperative games, the intensity of non-
player game events are mediated by a meter, similar to
the “terror track” in Arkham Horror and the “infection
rate track” in Pandemic. Our meter has been opportunis-
tically titled the Information Operations Condition (IN-
FOCON) meter, following the DoD’s network condition
naming convention. The INFOCON meter reflects the
magnitude of attention received by the network from its
administrators and corresponds loosely to the perceived
condition of a network under attack. Ultimately, the
threat level may increase to the point where admins shut
the network down, resulting in a loss for the players.
4.6 Limitations
Like all physical simulations of the digital world, we ac-
knowledge that [d0x3d!] is imperfect. We believe stu-
dents playing a game reflecting computer security ideas
intuitively accept that the medium fails to reflect com-
plete technical accuracy. We give some examples of me-
chanics we feel misrepresent the field, and remark that
we are actively developing resources to identify and cor-
rect student misunderstanding after play.
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Figure 1: Early designs for a compromised node: a phys-
ical “hole” in a greyed-out icon (top left), a negated color
change (top right), an X and a negated color change (bot-
tom left), and the final design (bottom right) using just a
background color change.
simplistic. The four categories of valuable assets are ar-
bitrary and overlapping. As a result, categorization of
real-world assets in these terms may be challenging: a
birth certificate may be PII or, at times, an authentica-
tion credential. Further, representing data using a token
is flawed: once a trade secret is known or embarrass-
ing photos are leaked, these may not be reclaimed in any
meaningful fashion. More generally, the game’s focus
on confidential data fails to represent the variety of other
valued properties, like availability or integrity.
The game’s network representation is overly simplis-
tic and does not reflect a sophisticated notion of network
adjacency, even for a planar graph. Representing the
player using a pawn leverages an inappropriate physical
analogy, likening compromising a server to invading a
contested space or burglary. This, of course, is flawed
and misrepresents both the scale and automation enjoyed
by attackers. More generally, the game fails to repre-
sent anything beyond a penetrate and patch approach to
network security, precluding from its mechanics even
the possibility of trusted systems, active defense mech-
anisms or adaptive security countermeasures.
5 Product Design and Development
We share some of our observations and lessons-learned
in developing our game as a physical product.
5.1 Game Iconography
Research related to intuitive security iconography has
been largely concerned with standardizing visualizations
Figure 2: Design for the Social Engineer: a stylized hu-
man figure (left) and the final weeble character (right).
of security policy or security status indicators. Our game
has a different usability requirement: the iconography for
a piece of technology in the game should lend some intu-
ition about its role and purpose in a network. While some
semi-standard iconography exists—like Cisco’s network
pictograms and Microsoft’s network icons for Visio—
there has been little usability research showing these to
be effective in communicating an idea or imparting an
intuition to a broad audience. Instead, for our game,
we selected icons originally developed for customizing
GUIs. Unlike network diagrams, these are representa-
tions which are intended to be consumed and understood
by end-users as part of a user-interface.
The remainder of the game’s graphic design was
largely an exercise in selecting and adapting existing
pictograms (chosen to be relatively intuitive), creating
abstract but clear elements to reinforce mechanics, and
double-coding representations for clarity. For example,
a compromised node features a broken border, reinforc-
ing the rule that hackers can enter this node or exit this
node to any adjacent, compromised node (see Figure 1).
We attempted to keep design elements relatively mini-
mal, and removed or softened our reliance on physical
analogies when we believed they might reinforce incor-
rect intuitions in the player.
5.2 Player Avatars
Nowak observes that players find anthropomorphic
avatars more attractive and credible, and are more likely
to choose those [22]. Thus, we targeted anthropomorphic
figures, rather than objects or some generic representa-
tion of software. We were concerned, however, about
player representation, due to a significant body of lit-
erature criticizing player avatar design in video games.
While we developed artwork for detailed, human avatars
with their own style and clothes, we rejected these based
on the belief they might restrict player expression and
undermined homophily. Heeter observes that games
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girls invented were more likely to include customizable
avatars than those boys invented [14]. Nowak observes
that players strongly prefer to be represented by avatars
that match their own gender [22]. In general, we felt the
lessons learned from video game design informed us that
players may be disappointed by representations whose
clothing, accessories and gender were selected for them,
may not align with their preference, and restricted their
freedom of representation and ability to role play. Ul-
timately, we designed relatively androgynous, anthropo-
morphic avatars, resembling the pawns of the game (see
Figure 2). We are aware that a gender bias may cause
our androgynous characters to be interpreted as male:
Bradshaw et al. [6] observe this in video games, although
their findings suggest girls may be more likely to inter-
pret an androgynous character as female. We leave open
a more thorough player study, to see which iconography
has promise to be a better outreach instrument.
5.3 Language Dependence
Text-heavy games are less accessible to students whose
first language is not English. So too, games with too
many “in jokes” and cultural references become exclu-
sionary and work against our outreach goals. The web-
site Board Game Geek suggests a 0–4 language neutral-
ity rating to judge if a game is accessible to non-native
speakers. A 0-neutrality game has few or no components
with text, such as Chess or UNO. A 3-neutrality game
poses a serious challenge for language conversion, as in
Steve Jackson’s Munchkin or Chez Geek. A 4-neutrality
game is essentially unplayable by non-native speakers,
such as Scrabble or Trivial Pursuit. [d0x3d!] ranks in the
0–1 range, as it may (at most) require a small cheat-sheet
to play. While we have not studied the game with ESL
populations formally, we find anecdotal evidence that the
game imposes no serious language barrier. In particular,
within the first week of our release, the game was forked
for Polish and Chinese translation. We currently have
over a dozen forks, mostly devoted to translation.
5.4 Open-Sourcing Board Games
One of our design goals was to develop a game that is
free to use, free to adapt and free to remix. Several game
designers have released their original work under such
licenses: the strategy game Sovereign is released under a
CC-BY-SA license and Elevation of Privilege is released
under a CC-BY license. Far fewer games have transpar-
ently re-used open-source components. The board game
GiftTRAP, a notable exception, used crowd-sourcing via
Flickr to gather artwork: users licensed their submissions
under a CC-BY license for inclusion in the game, and the
resulting cards both carry attribution and are distributed
online under a CC-BY-NC license.
Our game re-uses open-source icons, e.g., those from
the Open Security Alliance, Tango and others. We found
that licenses associated with candidate icons posed an
interesting challenge: some icon sets were incompati-
ble with one another, and some even carried software
licenses (generally agreed to be inappropriate for cre-
ative content). Certainly, combining incompatible li-
censes into a derivative work is not possible. However, it
is unclear what is a derivative work in a board game. That
is, it is unclear how to interpret “copyleft” in the context
of physical games. We consider a game to be a collection
of components, where each component is a work carry-
ing its own license. We find this to be the only reason-
able interpretation, as requiring a uniform license across
all components quickly runs into problems. Does one
consider all components actively in play during a game?
All components ever produced? All expansion packs and
boosters? If two game pieces are so functionally insepa-
rable that one cannot be discarded and re-implemented in
isolation, then we consider these to be a single functional
component that must share a license; however, requiring
a strictly uniform license across all components quickly
becomes untenable for any open, re-mixable game.
6 Field Tests
Since Spring 2012, we have played [d0x3d!] with stu-
dents in a variety of extracurricular settings, including:
CyberAdventurers, Salinas, CA. A week-long summer
day camp designed to introduce middle school students
to topics within computer science. Students had little to
no experience with security concepts. We played with a
mixed-gender group of 15-20 students, largely from pop-
ulations underrepresented in CS.
Information Systems Security Association (ISSA) Tri-
angle InfoSecCon, Raleigh, NC. An annual IT security
event sponsored by the Raleigh ISSA Chapter that, as
part of its mission, encourages local high-school students
to participate. We played with a mixed-gender group of
15-20 high school students, largely from populations un-
derrepresented in CS.
Hartnell Community College, Salinas, CA. On two
different occasions we played the game with students
enrolled in a network security course at a local com-
munity college. Each time, we played with a predomi-
nantly male group of 25-30 undergraduate students, each
of whom were pursuing a major related to computer sci-
ence and information systems.
Monterey Academy of Oceanographic Science
(MAOS), Monterey, CA. A day-long outreach event
serving MAOS, a STEM program at Monterey High
School for high-achieving students. We played with a
mixed-gender group of 65-70 high school students.
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6.1 Observations
Much remains to assess our game’s impact and its abil-
ity to meet its various learning objectives. We remark
that assessment strategies for informal security games,
like ours, have been largely unexplored in the academic
literature. The task appears to be far more complicated
than in the context of serious games, for which assess-
ment (while still difficult) tends both to target a narrower
set of learning outcomes and to explore these in a more
explicit manner, e.g., using a partial simulation game to
teach and evaluate student ability to configure a firewall.
We have begun to formulate pre-test and post-test ac-
tivities to gauge student understanding relative to our se-
curity terminology. For example, one of our play ses-
sions featured a post-game instrument in the form of
a worksheet, where students collaborated to associate
a technical term featured in the game to its real-world
definition, assisted by its in-game context. While most
students completed this task successfully, without better
pre-test evaluation, instrument factor analysis and a con-
trol group, our game’s role in this outcome is unclear.
The observations that follow are a type of “action re-
search” investigation to evaluate the effectiveness of the
game; however, our results are too preliminary to draw
meaningful conclusions.
6.1.1 Contextualizing Player Values
In one play session, students customized their digital
assets before playing the game. For example, rather
than use generically-named assets, one group played
with ‘my house alarm code’ (authentication credential),
‘grandma’s recipe for arroz con gandules’ (intellectual
property), ‘Elisa’s mom’s bank account number’ (finan-
cial data), and ‘Yasmine’s address’ (PII). We found this
small task helped us check for student understanding re-
lated to these terms, by observing group discussions and
the choices written on students’ game pieces. Forcing
students to map their personal values to the in-game nar-
rative may also have been a factor in the spontaneous,
student-driven group discussion about online safety that
followed play. We now include a customizable digital as-
set mat as part of the staple game, and are developing a
lesson plan to assist teachers in discussing digital assets
before and after playing with students.
6.1.2 Exploring Network Layouts
In several play sessions, students elected to re-play the
game, working as a group to intentionally configure the
network with the goal of making the game as challeng-
ing as possible. This involved placing nodes holding
the assets behind hardened nodes, with minimal connec-
tions to the network and far away from the starting po-
sitions of the hackers. Thus, high value nodes became
harder to reach and hackers occupying these positions
were more likely to be ejected from the network, should
they be discovered during the patch round. Some stu-
dents also began to explore “house rules” for the game,
inventing variant mechanics such as combining two sets
of games and making the goals competitive rather than
cooperative. We feel these observations show students
demonstrating the type of perspective shift and strategic
thinking that must be employed in configuring real-life
networks to withstand attack. We see this type of adver-
sarial thinking as a major success in engaging players to
think like a security professional through play.
6.2 Feedback
Generally, players have reported positive experiences
playing the game. Some students have expressed interest
in playing the game with their parents; likewise, adults
have shown interest in using it with their children. One
manager expressed interest in [d0x3d!] as an icebreaker
with employees, before talking about local IT policies.
While, we have received no reports of negative experi-
ences, we have observed occasional low interest during
game play or confusion with rules. One fear associated
with cooperative games, in general, is that a dominant
personality may inhibit collaboration, i.e. a bully can ruin
the game for everyone. We presume this applies equally
to our game, but we have not witnessed the phenomena
during play sessions; we note that an adult presence at
each session may contribute to the observed behavior of
our players. More generally, we observe that coopera-
tive play in our game encourages discussion about strat-
egy and rule interpretation, and may play a larger role in
starting a dialogue about the game’s relationship to real-
life phenomena.
7 Conclusions
We have summarized lessons learned and experiences
with developing and playing [d0x3d!], motivating infor-
mal games as a promising tool for security lessons with
modest educational objectives. This is largely work-in-
progress, as much remains to evaluate the effectiveness
of these games in meeting their goals. Our game inher-
its those challenges facing any game used in education:
relevancy to curriculum, accessibility to and appropriate-
ness for its audience, and difficulty in evaluation. We are
actively working to collect feedback related to these is-
sues, more directly and systematically.
We are actively developing lessons appropriate for di-
rect use in the K-12 classroom, based on our observations
of how student players tended to interact with the game
(see Section 6). We are working with local K-12 teachers
to adjust these lessons, to scaffold and reinforce existing
curricular goals, using our game as the context for rele-
vant follow-on activities: critical reading of essays, inter-
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preting charts and graphs, and doing non-encyclopedia
research. We are also working on ways to encourage
players to re-mix and adapt the game. During initial play
tests, players frequently tested the game’s limits by imag-
ining new rules and cards, often with suggestions along
the lines of “wouldn’t it be cool if there was a card that
did x...” To encourage this, we are developing an online,
customizable card creator, to more easily generate new
characters, nodes and other game pieces.
[d0x3d!] is released under an open-source content li-
cense allowing free distribution and adaptation. It is
available for print-and-play 2 or as an assembled game
via an on-demand print service; for details, see its web-
site: http://www.d0x3d.com/.
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